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ANALYSIS9 min read

EU’s “One Europe, One Market” Strategy: What It Means for Global Steel — And Why Energy Remains the Achilles Heel

By Special Correspondent · SteelMath

The European Union has made its most ambitious move in a decade to reclaim industrial competitiveness. At the March 2026 European Council, EU leaders formally adopted the “One Europe, One Market” agenda — a concrete, time-bound roadmap to fully integrate the single market by the end of 2027. For the global steel industry, including Indian producers with export ambitions to Europe, this initiative carries significant implications across trade, energy policy, carbon regulation, and market access.

Here is what steel professionals need to understand — and what remains unresolved.

What “One Europe, One Market” Actually Proposes

The initiative, announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the EU leaders’ summit on February 12, 2026, builds on two landmark competitiveness reports — one by Enrico Letta and another by Mario Draghi — that diagnosed the structural weaknesses holding Europe back: regulatory fragmentation, weak capital markets, high energy costs, and barriers to cross-border trade.

The strategy focuses on five priority areas, each with specific measures and deadlines within 2026–2027:

1. Single market integration: A new “EU Inc.” legal framework for cross-border business, improved recognition of professional qualifications, and a European Business Wallet to reduce administrative duplication.

2. Regulatory simplification: A commitment that all new EU initiatives follow a “simplicity-by-design” principle and an explicit call to member states to stop “gold plating” — the practice of adding unnecessary national rules when transposing EU directives.

3. Affordable energy: Recognised as the most urgent challenge for energy-intensive industries.

4. Industrial renewal and innovation: The Industrial Accelerator Act proposed on March 4, 2026, introduces “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements in public procurement for strategic sectors — with steel explicitly named alongside cement, aluminium, and automotive.

5. Investment mobilisation: Deeper capital markets, progress on the Savings and Investment Union, and a European Competitiveness Fund within the 2028–2034 EU budget.

The Commission has also set a concrete target: increase manufacturing’s share of EU GDP from 14.3% in 2024 to 20% by 2035. That is an extraordinarily ambitious goal given the current trajectory of industrial decline.

The Steel Industry’s Response: Cautious Welcome, Sharp Warning

EUROFER, the European Steel Association representing producers across the EU, has welcomed the recognition of affordable energy as a priority. But the association’s response has been anything but complacent.

On February 11, 2026 — the day before the EU leaders’ summit — EUROFER backed a call to action by European companies and industries in Antwerp, attended by more than 500 industry leaders and six EU heads of state. The core demand was unambiguous: bring electricity prices down as a precondition for Europe’s industrial future.

EUROFER’s position rests on hard numbers. In the first half of 2025, electricity prices for large industrial users in the EU stood at approximately €0.16 per kWh — more than double the rate in the United States. Before the 2021–2022 energy crisis, European industrial electricity was roughly €44 per MWh. EUROFER has called for restoring prices close to that level, and has stated that electricity costs of around €50 per MWh are the minimum threshold for energy-intensive industries like steel to remain globally competitive while investing in decarbonisation.

Henrik Adam, president of EUROFER and executive chairman of Tata Steel Netherlands Holding, framed the stakes clearly: without relief from high electricity costs, investment in low-carbon steel will move to other regions and European capacity will be permanently lost. Axel Eggert, EUROFER’s director-general, reinforced this: keeping steel production in Europe is not merely an industrial issue but essential for the bloc’s economic security and strategic autonomy.

The warning is backed by real-world consequences already unfolding. ThyssenKrupp announced a 40% workforce reduction — 11,000 jobs — in its steel division. Salzgitter postponed its flagship green steel project (Salcos) by three years, citing unviable economics under current energy costs. EU steel production has been in contraction, with apparent steel consumption declining in 2022 (−8%), 2023 (−6%), 2024 (−1.1%), and showing only a marginal decline of approximately −0.2% in 2025.

The Energy Problem: Why It’s the Hardest Nut to Crack

Every other element of the “One Europe, One Market” strategy — regulatory simplification, capital markets union, industrial procurement preferences — is difficult but tractable. Energy pricing is different. It’s a structural problem rooted in how European electricity markets are designed.

The EU’s electricity pricing mechanism is based on a marginal cost model where the most expensive power plant needed to meet demand in any given hour sets the price for all electricity sold in that hour. Because natural gas plants are often the marginal producer, electricity prices remain tightly coupled to gas prices — even when the vast majority of power in a given market comes from cheaper renewables, nuclear, or hydro.

This means that even as Europe adds record renewable capacity, industrial electricity prices don’t fall proportionally because gas — often the marginal fuel — still sets the clearing price. During the Hormuz crisis, this linkage has become even more damaging: the disruption to LNG flows from Qatar (which had declared force majeure) and general energy market volatility have pushed European gas prices up, dragging electricity prices along with them.

EUROFER has specifically called for the EU to decouple electricity prices from fossil fuel costs through structural reforms to market design. The association also demands greater transparency around the removal of fossil fuel-based plants from the merit order, and a timely assessment of alternative market models that better reflect the EU’s changing energy mix.

The Commission’s “One Europe, One Market” agenda acknowledges the need for both short-term relief and long-term structural change. But it notably lacks a specific electricity price target or a commitment to a particular market design reform. EUROFER has flagged this gap, cautioning that without a comprehensive assessment of electricity market design, the EU may struggle to deliver meaningful results.

What This Means for the Global Steel Landscape

The EU’s strategy has implications that extend well beyond Europe’s borders.

For Indian steel exporters, the picture is mixed. On one hand, the Industrial Accelerator Act’s “Made in EU” preferences in public procurement could disadvantage imported steel in European infrastructure projects. Combined with CBAM’s definitive phase (which started January 1, 2026), Indian steel faces a rising wall of trade and carbon-related barriers when entering the European market. EU steel exports from India already fell under pressure in the second half of 2025 after the US imposed 50% tariffs, and the European route is getting harder, not easier.

On the other hand, if the EU fails to reduce energy costs and European steel production continues contracting, the bloc will become more dependent on imports for downstream manufacturing — not less. European construction, automotive, and machinery sectors need steel regardless of where it comes from. A weaker European steel sector could paradoxically create more import demand, provided the tariff and CBAM barriers are navigable.

For Chinese steel, the implications are more directly negative. The EU has specifically excluded China from developing-country exemptions in its existing safeguard measures on steel, and the new strategy’s emphasis on “European champions” and procurement preferences signals further market closure.

For steel producers globally, the most important signal is this: energy cost is becoming the primary axis of steel industry competitiveness. The regions that can deliver electricity at $40–60 per MWh to industrial users — whether through cheap renewables (India, Middle East), cheap gas (US), or cheap hydro (Scandinavia, Brazil) — will attract the next generation of steel capacity investment. The regions that cannot, risk deindustrialisation regardless of how strong their policy intent may be.

The Four Metrics That Will Determine Success

The “One Europe, One Market” strategy is the most comprehensive EU industrial policy framework in over a decade. Whether it succeeds depends on four measurable outcomes:

1. Electricity price convergence. The critical benchmark is whether industrial electricity costs move towards €50 per MWh across EU member states, down from the current approximately €160 per MWh (€0.16/kWh). Without this, every other measure is undermined.

2. Regulatory burden reduction. EU companies currently dedicate 1.5 times more senior staff to compliance than their US counterparts. The EU has committed to a 25% reduction in reporting requirements and a “simplicity-by-design” principle for all new legislation. Whether this translates into measurable cost savings for steel producers will be visible by mid-2027.

3. Investment in green steel. Salzgitter, ThyssenKrupp, ArcelorMittal, SSAB, and other European producers have announced green steel projects worth tens of billions of euros. The EU’s credibility hinges on whether these projects proceed or continue to be postponed. If energy costs don’t come down and CBAM revenue isn’t recycled into industrial support, expect further delays.

4. Import dependence. If European steel consumption recovers (EUROFER projects +3.1% growth in 2026) but domestic production doesn’t keep pace, the gap will be filled by imports — from India, Turkey, and increasingly from non-traditional sources routing around trade barriers. The manufacturing GDP target of 20% by 2035 will ring hollow if Europe imports the steel that builds its infrastructure.

SteelMath Assessment

The direction of the EU’s “One Europe, One Market” strategy is correct. The diagnosis — regulatory fragmentation, energy cost disadvantage, underinvestment in industrial capacity — is accurate and backed by extensive data. The political commitment, with a formal European Council endorsement and time-bound implementation deadlines, is stronger than any previous effort.

But diagnosis and prescription are not the same as treatment and cure. The steel industry’s reaction — welcoming the intent while sharply warning about execution — captures the core tension. European steelmakers have heard ambitious commitments before. What they need now is electricity they can afford, regulations they can navigate, and trade protection that works until they’ve completed the green transition.

The next 18 months will tell whether “One Europe, One Market” becomes the blueprint for resilient, green industrial growth — or another well-intended strategy with limited real-world impact.

For Indian steel professionals, the takeaway is clear: the European market is simultaneously becoming more protected (through CBAM, procurement preferences, and safeguard measures) and more strategically important (as global competition for market access intensifies). Understanding the EU policy landscape is no longer optional for any steel company with international ambitions.

Data in this article has been verified against official EU Commission documents (COM(2026) 46), European Council conclusions (March 2026), EUROFER press releases and market outlook reports, and reporting from SteelOrbis, Eurometal, and Argus Media. All figures are current as of March 25, 2026.

Related on SteelMath: See our CBAM impact analysis for Indian exporters, and use our Weight Calculator for production planning.

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